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.i DEREGULATION: INVITATION
o TO DISASTER IN THE S&L
INDUSTRY
FRED E. CASE*
INTRODUCTION
In 1971 the Hunt Commission report set in motion a series of national
legislative reforms that, by the early 1980s, culminated in almost com-
plete deregulation of the savings and loan industry. The professed goal
of deregulation was to encourage competition among financial institu-
tions and to eliminate the savings and loan industry in favor of a new
kind of financial system. Pursuant to the plan, only a few small special-
ized S&Ls were expected to survive.'
Based on a disastrous mix of market realities and political and eco-
nomic theories, deregulation was an invitation to disaster. Rather than
streamlining the overburdened banking system, deregulation dismantled
an effective home lending industry and produced a financial problem of
disastrous proportions.2
The complete disaster is yet to unfold. Deregulation has created an
infectious financial disease that may eliminate the home-mortgage lend-
ing industry and threaten other financial institutions as well.' This un-
happy outlook is premised on an evaluation of the reasons for
"deregulation," and its associated problems, that Norman Strunk and I
presented in a 1988 publication.4 This presentation is intended to expand
* This speech was given by Professor Case as part of the Annual Financial
Institutions and Regulation Symposium at the Fordham University School of Law.
1. Cf H.J. Cassidy, The Role of the Savings and Loan Associations in the 1980s, at
1, Speaker's presentation at the Third Annual Banking Conference: "The Changing Roles
of Financial Institutions in the 1980s," Norfolk State University, Sept. 26, 1980 (available
from author's files) ("Ever since the vision of the 1971 Hunt Commission of a single type
of financial institution, with specialized institutions allowed but not specifically en-
couraged, there has arisen a thrust to achieve this vision.") [hereinafter H.J. Cassidy,
Banking Conference Presentation]. Mr. Cassidy is the Director of the General Research
Division of the Office of Policy and Economic Research of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board.
2. See Bernstein, A Year Into the Bailout: The Future of S&Ls, L.A. Times, Aug. 5,
1990, at D9, col. 1.
3. See Srodes, Strange Silence in S&L Debate, L.A. Times, Mar. 5, 1989, Part IV, at
3, col. 1.
4. Much of this presentation is a summary of a book Norman Strunk and I pub-
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upon and better define the reasons we gave then for the disastrous conse-
quences of deregulation.
First, the principal disaster of deregulation-the dismantling of an in-
dustry that was an effective source of home financing-will be examined.
Next, the disastrous costs associated with deregulation's failure will be
discussed. Finally, the failure of deregulatory theories and the remaining
unresolved problems of deregulation will be outlined.
I. THE DISMANTLING OF AN EFFECTIVE HOME LENDING INDUSTRY
The harbinger of disaster was that deregulation was intended to fix
something that wasn't broke. The regulated S&L industry, that deregu-
lation was designed to dismantle, had already proven itself an effective
source of home loan financing. The industry's shortcoming, that deregu-
lation was supposed to cure, was a lack of competition.
The dismantling of the S&L industry began in earnest with the phasing
out of Regulation Q early in 1980.' With subsequent deregulatory
measures the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") expected
that "[b]y 1986 an S&L [would] have to compete head-on with all other
S&Ls, with commercial banks, with mutual savings banks, with credit
unions, with money market funds, with corporate borrowers, and with
the U. S. Treasury."6 In effect, the S&Ls would be thrown to the
wolves. Only a few years earlier the S&L industry was dominated by
neighborhood S&Ls that specialized in servicing local housing markets;
they were only dimly aware of the levels of competition they would be
facing.7 Deregulation had a "dismantling" effect because it was intended
to eliminate S&Ls by collapsing their functions into large-scale generic
financial organizations.8 This would prove disastrous because the tradi-
tional, regulated S&L industry was the most effective source of home
financing.
A. The Special Nature of Traditional S&Ls
The disaster associated with folding the S&Ls into a generic financial
system occurred because, in carrying out their mission of deregulation,
the deregulators did not consider the "special" nature of the S&L
industry.9
lished in 1988. See N. Strunk & F. Case, Where Deregulation Went Wrong: A Look at the
Causes Behind Savings and Loan Failures in the 1980s (U.S. League of Savings Institu-
tions, 1988).
5. See, e.g., M. Mayer, The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery 92-93 (1990) (discussing
the effects of the dismantling of Regulation Q).
6. See H.J. Cassidy, Banking Conference Presentation, supra note 1, at 1.
7. See id.
8. See Bacon, Big Banks Would Get Vastly Broader Powers Under Treasury's Plan,
Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
9. See Lockwood, Thrift Industry Passes its 170th Anniversary, in 2 Outlook of the
Fed. Home Loan Bank Sys., No. 5, at 20-24 (Sept./Oct. 1986).
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Traditionally, community interest, not personal interest, was the hall-
mark of local S&Ls.10 From the beginning, S&Ls were members of an
industry that expected regulatory "guidance." This attitude did not
change appreciably until deregulation began in earnest in the early
1980's."
The unique, community-based character of the S&L industry allowed
it to perform an important home financing function that, consequently,
contributed significantly to overall national economic development.' 2
S&Ls have in the past funded up to 50% of existing single-family home
sales and between 25% and 50% of annual new home construction and
sales. Housing construction has accounted for approximately 3% to 6%
annually of the GNP; when the economic multipliers associated with it
are considered, the contribution is equal to 7% to 17% of GNP. (See
Table 1).
Furthermore, in many years residential construction has had an im-
portant counter-cyclical effect. 3 S&Ls were also an important force in
implementing a national housing policy to provide affordable housing for
all American families, and in supporting the programs of the Federal
Housing Administration ("FHA") and Veterans Administration hous-
ing-benefit programs.' 4 The economic contributions of a specialized in-
dustry have thus been made in spite of, or, as I would see it, because of,
the very local nature of the traditional S&Ls.
Regulation was essential to the survival of the traditional S&L. Thus,
when the regulations that protected the conventional services were dis-
mantled, so was the industry they protected. Thereafter, the needs the
industry serviced would go unsatisfied and the vital economic contribu-
tions would be lost.
B. Regulation and the Traditional S&L Character
The nature of S&L regulation ensured that the associations specialized
in local home lending. Loans were limited to a 50 mile lending radius
and to single-family homes, and association directors were local business
and community leaders. Most associations were federally chartered mu-
tual associations, thus assuring some continuity of managers and direc-
10. See N. Strunk & F. Case, supra note 4, at 17; N. Strunk, Reducing the Risks of
Financial Crises The Savings and Loan Story, 1-2 (unpublished manuscript presented to
the Conf. on Reducing the Risk of Econ. Crises, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Cambridge,
Mass., Oct. 17, 1989).
11. See N. Strunk & F. Case, supra note 4, at 17-29.
12. See Wallace, Home Ownership Drives the Thrift System, in 2 Outlook of the Fed.
Home Loan Bank Sys., No. 5, at I 1 (Sept./Oct. 1986).
13. See D. Lessard & F. Modigliani, Inflation and Residential Financing: Problems
and Potential Solutions, in Capital Markets and the Housing Sector: Perspectives on Fi-
nancial Reform 217, 218 (R.M. Buckley, J.A. Tuccillo & K.E. Villani eds. 1977) [herein-
after Capital Markets and the Housing Sector].
14. See R1M Buckley, J.A. Tuccillo & K.E. Villani, Overview, in Capital Markets and
the Housing Sector, supra note 13, at 15-21.
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tors. State chartered associations were largely stock types but were
subject to FHLBB regulation and review when they applied for savings
account insurance. Broad ownership of stock was required, and no one
stockholder could own more than 5% of an association's stock. By ac-
cepting this regulatory scheme, S&Ls received protection from
competition.
Some of that protection from market rate competition was provided by
Regulation Q. Savings accounts could be insured through the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"), and liquidity was
provided through membership on the regional FHLBB. Thereafter, ad-
ditional liquidity could be had through packaged mortgage sales to the
secondary mortgage markets made by government-sponsored corpora-
tions, such as the Government National Mortgage Association
("GNMA"), the Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA")
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC").
As thus conceived, the traditional model of a regulated S&L industry
flourished until exposed to the ravages of the market when the protective
cover of regulation was lifted.
C. Industry Changes Wrought by Deregulation
Deregulation was seen as an opportunity for improving the overall
national financial system because the traditional S & L industry was seen
as "passe." 5 The FHLBB's Office of Policy and Economic Research,
speaking through its Director, Dale P. Riordan, stated that "[w]e [the
FHLBB] see less need for regulation because there will be more market
discipline.... The most important economic factor affecting mergers in
the 1980s will be increased competition .... [T]here will be a significant
shrinkage in the number of savings and loan associations in existence."' 6
The Director, speaking to the Arkansas Savings and Loan League, con-
tinued: "[Y]ou will see a common philosophy ... of deregulation...
that rejects the notion that the regulator ought to impose strict condi-
tions just for the sake of protecting the few .... In summary, it seems
clear that market discipline will replace the regulator in the 1980s."
True to the word of its proponents, deregulation changed the approach
of the S&L industry completely. 8 By introducing the element of compe-
tition, or "market discipline," a premium was now placed on advancing
the self-interests of the officers, stockholders and directors of S&Ls, and
15. See D.P. Riordian, Deregulation and the Future of the Thrift Industry 7, Sept. 8,
1980, presented at 63d Annual Convention, Arkansas Savings and Loan League, Sept. 8,
1980 (available from author's files). Mr. Riordian is the Director of the Office of Policy
and Economic Research at the FHLBB.
16. Id. at 2, 9.
17. Id. at 3, 11.
18. See M. Mayer, supra note 5, at 60-62.
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service to local housing markets became an issue of minor importance.19
With the removal of Regulation Y, one or only a few persons could
now become major stockholders. As such, they could exert a dominant
influence over all association operations. The new and vast array of non-
residential lending that these newly-empowered actors were now permit-
ted to engage in under the Garn-St Germain amendment of 1982, how-
ever, were well beyond the expertise of the traditional S&L managers and
directors. Many were unaware of the disasters that lay ahead.
II. THE DISASTERS OF DEREGULATION
From the beginning, deregulation was a disaster for the traditional
S&Ls because more time and resources were required to operate in a
deregulated environment than were available to local associations or that
were provided by Congress. Moreover, the generic, large-scale financial
associations envisioned by the de-regulators have yet to emerge in any
significant number. The traditional S&L functions, however, are still
necessary, but must be performed in a different and more hostile, polit-
ical and business environment. To compete, the S&Ls had to abandon
their traditional functions in search of higher returns from high-risk ven-
tures. Such ventures also fed the gambling urge of the newly powerful
S&L owners.
Deregulation created a perfect environment for high-risk investors.'
Because one or only a few individuals could own an association (in con-
trast to the traditional, broad community-based S&L directorship) they
could engage in all kinds of real estate lending and investing projects.
Single-family lending could be and was abandoned for all practical pur-
poses. The historical safeguards-L., regulations-that might have pre-
vented such activities were no longer in place.
High-risk takers soon found, and exploited, a fatal flaw in the deregu-
latory scheme: The federally insured accounts of the typically local de-
positor (the traditional S&L customer) could be used to fund the lending
and investment projects that the deregulated S&Ls were now free to pur-
sue. The principal defect of deregulation, it now appears, was that it
failed to introduce the true market discipline that it claimed as its guid-
ing principle: While purportedly intended to introduce market discipline
and competition to S&L industry, deregulation spared the S&Ls the mar-
ket's rod of discipline-risk-and thus spoiled them. Coupling deregula-
tion with insured accounts secured for the high-risk takers in the
industry a steady flow of low-cost, risk-free funds for use in all kinds of
real estate ventures, residential or otherwise. Because the new S&L own-
19. See, e.g., S. Pizzo, M. Fricker & P. Muolo, Inside Job: The Looting of America's
Savings and Loans 156-176 (1989) (listing numerous examples).
20. See P. Zweig, Belly Up: The Collapse of the Penn Square Bank 81-89 (1985); see
also M. Mayer, supra note 5, at 6-17 (describing way risk-loving investors could make
easy profits in deregulated S&L industry).
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ers were playing with insured funds they could not lose, and therefore
had nothing to fear in the market that was supposed to discipline them.
Little attention, however, was paid to this inevitably dangerous and
causal relationship between insured savings accounts and risky investing.
Steady streams of new funds could be obtained locally and through bro-
kers. Loans could be packaged and sold through secondary markets; se-
curities could be created and sold; profits and interest "points" could be
obtained through joint ventures and participation loans. Under deregu-
lation many associations thus became money "milk cows" for venture-
some real estate entrepreneurs.
As the costs of deregulation mounted, the availability of home loan
financing decreased. At the same time, the costs of home ownership rose
and the percentage of families who could afford a home declined. Much
of this trend can be traced to the fact that deregulation did not eliminate
the complexities and special requirements of an effective home lending
process. The economies of specialization in the historic S&L industry
were (presumably) traded for the expected, but undefined, economies of
scale promised by generic financial institutions.
A. The Disastrous Costs of Deregulation
Little change was made to the S&L industry by deregulation, except
for the dismantling of a functioning, efficient system of home financing.
The costs associated with this change-the costs of liquidity, administra-
tion and fraud-however, were high and continue to mount.
The primary cause of these costs is the industry's liquidity problem.
By accelerating the industry's liquidity problems, deregulation increased
the administrative burden, and opened unusual opportunities for some in
the industry, in the name of liquidity, to engage in fraud and other crimi-
nal activities. In particular, the Garn-St Germain bill opened the door to
earning high rates on "unusual," non-residential investing and financ-
ing.21 The disaster of deregulation is that, ultimately, these costs will be
borne by the taxpayers, who will be left without any effective source of
home mortgage financing.
1. The Quest for and Cost of Liquidity
An S&L's fundamental task is to maintain sufficient liquidity to pay
for daily operations and to take advantage of profitable investments.
Borrowing-Le., collecting savings-is done on a short-term basis and
lending is done on a long-term basis. A problem occurs for S&Ls when
rate differentials-the cost of savings account deposits over the return on
long-term home mortgage loans-are too often negative. The cyclical
nature of real estate markets, increasing short-term interest rates and the
21. Cf. N. Strunk & F. Case, supra note 4, at 68-72 (discussing levels of various types
of S&L investments).
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long-term character of home mortgage loans are largely responsible for
this profit-damaging effect.
The elimination of Regulation Q and subsequent court rulings on
mortgage assumptions, however, only exacerbated this condition and
helped widen the gap. S&Ls were left promising high interest rates to
keep their deposits while holding mortgage portfolios with below-market
yields. The associations could either sell their mortgages at a loss, or
apply their available funds to high-yield, usually high-risk, investments.
A liquidity crisis was inevitable.
Inflation and high interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s exac-
erbated the liquidity problems of the S&Ls. Deregulation compounded
the problem by "overlooking" the undue influences of tax shelter laws,
and overly optimistic forecasts of market trends in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. In fact, deregulation was pushed in spite of the clear infla-
tionary chaos of the real estate markets in such states as Arizona, Colo-
rado, Florida and Texas. The lending freedoms given associations under
deregulation, that they used in their search for solutions to their liquidity
problems, naturally led the S&Ls to adopt "unusual" financing practices.
Under deregulation, the need for liquidity led to some "bizarre" ap-
proaches to attracting and keeping deposits and making loans. The use
of brokered funds, partnerships in dubious projects, financing of joint-
partnerships and loan participations in suspect commercial and indus-
trial properties reflected a desperate attempt by the S&Ls to use the free-
doms of deregulation to solve their liquidity problems.
Deregulation dealt with "illiquidity" by allowing the Resolution Trust
Corporation ("RTC") to acquire the failing associations, sell their assets
and apply the proceeds to their outstanding financial obligations, thereby
eliminating the interests of stockholders. Inevitably, the RTC incurred
regular losses, and it now owns associations burdened with billions of
dollars in financial obligations to be paid for with assets of questionable
worth.
The RTC's sales of S&L assets were expected to restore some liquidity,
but to date this has not been accomplished. In 1988, when the crisis
gained momentum, total S&L assets amounted to $1.359 trillion. Mort-
gages held had book values of $770 billion. (See Table 2). At that time,
Norman Strunk and I, using a loss of asset-value approach, estimated
that the costs of obtaining liquidity would equal $30 to $60 billion. Fed-
eral experts were estimating the cost at less than one-half of those
amounts. 2 Today, a cost of $600 billion, an amount equal to 44% of the
industry's total assets, is possible.
As of February 4, 1991, the Senate Banking Committee approved $78
billion for the RTC to take over another 225 insolvent S&Ls.' The cost
22. See N. Strunk, Deregulation and Savings and Loan Associations, U. SA., at 3, May
11, 1989, presented at "XXVIIth Inter-American Housing Conference, Guatemala."
23. See Thomas, Senate Banking Committee Approves $78 Billion More for S&L
Takeovers, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1991, at A4, col. 5.
1991]
S100 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
borne by the RTC to maintain these associations' liquidity seems immea-
surable-it could easily approach $1 trillion.
2. The Administrative Cost of Deregulation
Restoring the liquidity of the S&Ls is only one cost associated with
deregulation; other costs include administering the deregulatory pro-
grams designed to ultimately achieve liquidity. As the RTC is now struc-
tured, the administrative costs promise to be consistently extravagant,
and the process excruciatingly slow.
As recently as January 2, 1991, a report by a Presidentially appointed
law firm concluded that "[flederal regulators mishandled the disposal of
failed savings institutions in 1988 and likely added to the cost of the S&L
bailout."'24
The administrative problems facing the RTC are further complicated
by a persistent lack of congressional support.25 In 1991, housing con-
struction, sales and prices are expected to decline, and the declining value
of the real estate held by the RTC only increases the difficulty and cost of
its disposal. Yet, in February, 1991, the House Banking Committee re-
fused to pass a funding bill needed by the RTC to continue its asset sales,
thus raising the prospect of even further losses due to administrative
delay.
26
3. The Cost of Fraud
Any estimate of the costs of deregulation must include the extent to
which fraud and other criminal activity has siphoned off unrecoverable
funds. Fraud existed before deregulation, but only on a minor scale. Ac-
cording to FHLBB studies of the years from 1978 to 1985, of all cases of
fraud and embezzlement it referred to the U. S. Department of Justice,
85% to 89% were from banks, 7% to 9% were from S&Ls, and the
remainder were from credit unions.27 These figures suggest that tradi-
tionally, fraud has occurred most often in banks but only to a minor
extent in other financial institutions.
No one has yet presented an accurate estimate of the amount of fraud
resulting from deregulation, but a good estimate might be 25% of the
industry losses. More than coincidence was at work when levels of fraud
increased markedly under the managerial "freedoms" associated with de-
regulation. One basic thesis of this presentation (and a forthcoming
book) is that elements of organized crime took advantage of deregulation
24. See New S&L Report Says Federal Regulators Mishandled Bailout, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 2, 1991, at As, col. 2.
25. See Thomas & Duke, Bush S&L-Rescue Plan Is Sailing Along, But Congress Plans
Some Major Changes, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1989, at A4, col. 5.
26. See Thomas, House Panel's Refusal to Clear Funds Could Result in Additional
S & L Losses, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1991, at A2, col. 5.
27. See Editor's Note-Fraud Holds Steady, in 2 Outlook of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System, No. 5, inside front cover (Sept./Oct. 1986).
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to steal hundreds of millions of dollars.2" Much of the fraud was possible
because it was supported by "bad" appraisals. Dubious-many fraudu-
lent-appraisals of commercial, industrial and other non-residential
properties were often accepted without question by S&L directors and
loan officers, whose loan-appraisal expertise extended only to single-fam-
ily loans.
III. WHY DEREGULATION FAILED
A. The Failure of Accounting & Reporting Systems
The failure of accounting and reporting systems impedes any accurate
estimate of the losses and costs of deregulation. Those losses can never
be estimated accurately without some improvement in the application of
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), used by the in-
dustry's accountants and regulators, to S&Ls.29
The deficiencies of GAAP are slowly being brought to light. The Wall
Street Journal opined that "Congress let S&Ls get by with accounting
practices that would have put the officers of less-favored businesses in
jail."30 All too frequently, an association's financial reports would be
certified as conforming to GAAP, the association would be declared
"healthy," and shortly thereafter regulators would declare the associa-
tion "insolvent." Notably, the accounting firm of Ernst & Young re-
cently agreed to pay the government more than $40 million in connection
with allegedly shoddy work.31
In the case of the Bell Savings and Loan Association (of San Mateo,
California) GAAP only partially revealed the financial disarray that the
association was in. Officers newly appointed by the FTC were faced with
the task of understanding the full nature of the financial problems of the
association, equipped with only inadequate or inappropriate data fur-
nished according to GAAP.32 The reports simply did not provide appro-
priate managerial insights into the full nature of the existing financial
problems of the association. Ironically, however, the GAAP method was
useful to S&L managers in keeping the association operating despite con-
tinuing losses.
The major problem with GAAP is that it is not sufficiently sensitive to
rapidly changing market events and new regulatory requirements. Yet,
the dismantling of the S&Ls proceeded, supported by a steady flow of
such reports that were also based on a variety of political and economic
28. See N. Strunk & F. Case, supra note 4, at 135.
29. See id, at 16; M. Mayer, supra note 5, at 7-13; Cool It, Thrift Lobbyists, Wall St.
J., Feb. 6, 1991, at B3, col. 2.
30. Ponzi Would Love It, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1989, at A12, col. 1.
31. See Ernst & Young Said to Set Pact With US on S & L Job, Wall St. J., Feb. 4,
1991, at A4, col. 2; N. Strunk & F. Case, supra note 4, at 75-78.
32. I was one of five directors appointed by the FHLBB of San Francisco to manage
the insolvent association. The assignment was to be for ninety days; it lasted three years.
Assests were reduced from $1.2 billion to $600 million.
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theories supporting deregulation. Notwithstanding all of these errors in
its implementation, the idea of deregulation itself was flawed.
B. The Failure of Deregulatory Theories
Deregulation was supported politically, in spite of the crumbling of the
S&L industry and the high costs of implementing deregulatory policies,
primarily because elected officials and FHLBB regulators saw deregu-
laton as the most appropriate method of solving what they saw as an
S&L industry crisis. Unfortunately, their actions were based on a disas-
trous mix of inappropriate, and poorly-presented and implemented, polti-
cal and economic theories.
Deregulation fit well with President Reagan's notions of competition
and free markets, and was sufficiently attractive, politically and theoreti-
cally, to attract the suppport of many elected officials, FHLBB officers
and academic theoreticians. Moreover, as an operational program, de-
regulation was an easily invoked, mindless advocacy of an ill-defined but
intuitively attractive goal. The potential disasters to be scored by deregu-
lation, however, were never fully considered or anticipated."
1. The Theoretical Push
Much of the strong and constant theoretical and political support for
deregulation came from FHLBB officers, particularly the appointed ones.
Research support was provided in a constant flow of reports by the
FHLBB research staff, who urged deregulation because it fit with the
"free market" philosophy of using "market discipline" to provide more
services for clients, eliminate redundancy, and increase long-run eco-
nomic efficiency.34
Deregulation was thus introduced largely because of its inherent ap-
peal to those seeking to impose "free market" competition and less gov-
ernment. The results have become increasingly disastrous. The theorists
have failed to flesh out their concepts and markets have changed, yet
poorly informed politicians continue to find strong political appeal in
supporting the deregulation concept.
2. FIRREA
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 ("FIRREA") was the first significant step towards improving the
33. See, e.g., Bryce Curry Seminar, Presentation by Preston Martin, The Future Role
of Thrift Institutions-Papers and Proceedings, 45-47 (Apr. 9-10, 1987) (calling S&Ls
"undervalued" and "a major growth opportunity").
34. See generally FHLBB Office of Policy and Economic Research, The Savings and
Loan Industry in the 1980s, Research Working Paper No. 100, passim (2d ed. July, 1981)
(discussing future role of S&L industry, the financial markets in which S&Ls operate, and
deregulation's effect on S&Ls).
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deregulatory program.35 The Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC")
was created by FIRREA to deal with insolvent S&Ls; however, it has
proven more costly and less effective than intended. Shrinkage of the
numbers of solvent associations continues at an accelerating pace. Seized
associations are managed at a survival level and the sales of their proper-
ties do not produce the kinds of funds expected, perhaps because of the
"fire sale" mentality that prevails among regulators.
Thrift supervision was placed under the Treasury, but to date that has
proven only moderately effective and questions are being raised about the
condition of commercial banks. FIRREA placed all insured accounts
under the supervision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") which still faces the same funding and inspection problems.
On the plus side, FIRREA did require that S&Ls keep a greater percent-
age of their assets in home mortgages. In addition, loans to one borrower
were restricted, land development projects were required to be placed in
independent subsidiaries, capital requirements were increased, appraisal
of portfolios was stengthened, and tax breaks were eliminated.
3. Where Free Market Theorists Failed
Notwithstanding the adoption of FIRREA, and the consideration of
other legislation, the theories behind deregulation have failed to deal
with a number of continuing issues. The following conditions reflect a
failure of the theorists to flesh out their concepts:
1) A mortgage is still the same type of "difficult" instrument, and all
the cyclical and cash flow problems associated with it remain unchanged.
Mortgages still suffer constant value changes when valued on a market
basis.
2) Savings associations were never in the money and securities mar-
kets and still are in no position to become involved on a professional,
competitive basis. The world of options, futures and other sophisticated
instruments is not within the regular expertise of S&L executives.
3) The nature of operations and competition in the industry has not
changed. Entry into the industry remains costly, and is still limited by
government. Rate competition does exist but only within bounds set by
regulation.
4) Management of the traditional S&L function of home mortgage
lending is still complex and calls for an array of supporting specialists,
specialized mortgage instruments, escrows, property appraisals and even
more complex approval and closing processes.
5) The information provided by GAAP or Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Regulatory Principles ("GAARP") is little changed, and re-
mains inadequate for the purposes of industry executives, regulatory
supervisors, and private savers or investors. Private savers and borrow-
35. See generally M. Mayer, supra note 5, at 275-83 (informative discussion of
FIRREA).
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ers still do not have access to the kinds of financial information that
would permit them to operate in an informed manner in a competitive
S&L industry.
6) Competent, professional regulators and supervisors continue to be
in short supply at a time when large financial institutions, that will re-
quire even more complex supervisory reviews, are emerging and being
permitted to enter into new kinds of investments.
7) Despite the passage of FIRREA, the nation still lacks a fully ar-
ticulated and implemented national housing policy. A critical element of
such a policy must be recognition of the special requirements of home
mortgage lending.
8) Finally, liquidity continues to be a major problem for the S&L
industry.
C. Political Failures
The education of our elected officials about the savings and home fi-
nancing industry was and is an important factor in obtaining deregu-
latory legislation. The S&L industry worked hard to bring its views to
the attention of the elected officials. The United States League of Sav-
ings Institutions made many "educational" presentations to Congress
and individual Congressmen in order to aid the politicians in under-
standing the S&L industry.36 Unfortunately, Congressmen continued to
appear poorly informed about, and at times almost indifferent to, the
problems of the industry. Rather than seeking a balanced and better in-
formed view, many elected officials found a great political payoff in sup-
porting "deregulation," and responded to the S&L problem on that basis.
Deregulation was supported by the FHLBB with endless reports from
an army of government and university academics who found great bene-
fits and small losses in the process.37 The United States League of Sav-
ings Institutions, which lobbied for S&L industry views, ultimately
became a weakened voice for the industry.3"
The presentations of those who opposed deregulation were infrequent
and not often listened to. As deregulation was implemented, a well-
rounded understanding of the pros and cons of deregulation was woefully
lacking. Key players in this process were the FHLBB Chairmen.
The FHLBB did little to enlighten the debates over deregulation be-
cause it quickly chose to advocate deregulation under the influence of its
36. See generally N. Strunk, Memorandum Re: Misstatements of Fact and Emphasis
With Respect to Problems of the Savings and Loan Business (discussing the inaccurate
handling of S&L issues by congressional committees) (available from author's files); As
S&L Crisis Grows, U.S. Savings League Loses Lobbying Clout, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1989,
at A1, col. 6.
37. The reports were prepared by a staff of academics through the FHLBB's Office of
Policy and Economic Research.
38. See As S & L Crisis Grows, U.S. Savings League Loses Lobbying Clout, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 7, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
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politically appointed chairmen. Although the S&L industry might have
expected more objectivity and balance from the chairmen of the FHLBB,
the deregulation concept was adopted first and most enthusiastically by
FHLBB Chairman Preston Market, and was promoted in varying de-
grees by succeeding chairmen.
Nevertheless, some saw that an objective position by the chairmen,
even the ability to implement many parts of deregulation, was practically
a" 'Mission Impossible' ever since the Reagan ideas of deregulation were
put into place in the savings and loan system."39 Even when the chair-
men tried to enforce some of the minimum elements of deregulation, they
faced hostile business and political environments. With the S&L indus-
try's advocates unable to speak effectively, and with the leadership of the
FHLBB's chairmen in jeopardy, deregulation proceeded without a per-
suasive advocate for the S&Ls' role in supporting home ownership
through home mortgage lending.4°
Further, those who presented theoretical support for deregulation so
persuasively learned little from earlier "storm warnings." Large generic
institutions, and deregulators who extolled the virtues of size, ignored the
lessons learned in the case of the Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma City:
Large financial institutions offer the same opportunities for failure and
fraud as small ones.
IV. A CONTINUING NEED FOR REGULATION
Deregulation did not eliminate all regulation, nor did it reduce the
costs and complexities of home mortgage lending, even though the S&Ls
now have greater lending and investing freedom. Regulation of the types
and amounts of loans to be made, liquidity reserves to be maintained,
financial standards for entry, as well as provision for the supervision and
examination of activities, and periodic reports of financial status, are still
needed. These decisions should not be left to "market discipline."
Current experiences suggest that besides neglecting home mortgage
lending (or, at best, failing to perform the function any better than the
traditional S&L), large, generic financial institutions pose greater and
more difficult regulatory review problems. One outstanding example is
the Penn Square fiasco in Oklahoma City. Such chicanery is still possi-
ble, and on an even larger scale. Moreover, in a market composed of the
large, competitive, generic financial institutions envisioned by deregu-
lators, small savers and small home-mortgagors cannot compete with
large corporate and government agency borrowers of the same institu-
tions. Continued regulation is required to ensure that the need for home
lending does not go unfulfilled.
Even if the large financial institutions envisioned by the deregulators
39. Letter, N. Strunk to F.R. Bleakely, Editor of American Banker (Dec. 6, 1989).
40. See Kuttner, The Real Culprit in the Thrift Debacle: Deregulation, Bus. Week,
July 23, 1990, at 16, col. 2.
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can be required (through regulation) to provide the same services to
small borrowers now provided by the home financing industry, little has
been gained by destroying that industry and recreating its functions in
another kind of financial institution. Nothing is to be gained by replac-
ing the so-called "duplicative" S&Ls with duplicative home-lending de-
partments in large, generic financial institutions. Whatever its
shortcomings, the traditional S&L is still the model best suited to per-
form the vital home-lending function.
Even if the proliferation of many small, local S&Ls is "duplicative," it
is doubtful the home-lending mission can be performed as efficiently or as
effectively by large, generic banking institutions. To date there is little
evidence to support the deregulators' faith in such a system's ability to
effectively service the home-lending market. Tremendous costs, how-
ever, have been incurred in this futile attempt to improve the home-lend-
ing industry, evidencing a need for a return to a traditional, regulated
S&L industry.
CONCLUSION
The theorists and politicians who promoted deregulation failed to
consider fully the consequences of deregulation to the savings and home
financing industry. Emphasizing "free markets," they paid only slight
attention to the many real problems still facing the S&L industry, and to
those who sought a better consumer based, competitive, savings and
home-loan industry that retained many of its traditional characteristics.
Given this disastrous mix of market realities and incompletely
thought-through political and economic theories, deregulators must still
address the following problems:
1) Developing a sound savings payment system.
2) Providing small, less sophisticated savers with risk-free investment
and savings opportunities.
3) Assuring an appropriate allocation of national credit to the home
financing industry.
4) Addressing and solving the cyclical nature of home financing.
5) Considering fully the consequences of eliminating the traditional
S&L industry.
6) Creating a competitive financial institutional environment that will
correct past mistakes by better understanding the realities of "market
discipline."
7) Enlarging and making better use of the secondary mortgage
markets.
8) Improving and supporting more profitable home lending
opportunities.
9) Revealing fully the goals and priorities of those favoring free mar-
kets, competition and deregulation.
If deregulation had not been so ideologically driven and blind to mar-
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ket realities and the special needs of the home financing and savings in-
dustry, it could have achieved more favorable results. As it was
conceived and implemented, however, deregulation was and is a disaster.
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TABLE 1
U.S. REAL ESTATE MARKETS (1960-1980)
[Vol. 59
Residential Investment Private Non-Farm
(% GNP) Residential
Housing Starts
Actual Employment (1,000 units)
Current Multipliers
GNP dollars %
Year ($ bill.) (bill.) Two Three change
1960 515.3
1961 533.8
1962 574.6
1963 606.9
1964 649.8
1965 705.1
1966 772.0
1967 816.4
1968 892.7
1969 963.9
1970 1015.5
1971 1102.7
1972 1212.8
1973 1359.3
1974 1472.8
1975 1990.5
1976 2249.7
1977 2508.2
1978 2732.0
1979 3052.6
1980 3166.0
1981 3401.6
1982 3052.6
1983 3401.6
1984 3774.7
1985 3992.5
1986 4231.6
1987 4525.3
1988 4880.6
1989 5233.4
1990 5544.6
26.3
26.4
29.0
32.1
32.8
33.1
30.9
31.1
37.7
41.2
40.5
55.1
68.6
73.3
64.8
62.3
81.1
108.6
129.2
139.1
122.5
122.3
105.1
152.0
179.1
185.6
217.3
226.4
232.5
234.7
242.2
10% 15%
10% 15%
10% 15%
11% 16%
10% 15%
9% 14%
8% 12%
8% 11%
8% 13%
9% 13%
8% 12%
10% 15%
11% 17%
11% 16%
9% 13%
6% 9%
7% 11%
9% 13%
9% 14%
9% 14%
8% 12%
7% 11%
7% 10%
9% 13%
9% 14%
9% 14%
10% 15%
10% 15%
10% 14%
9% 13%
9% 13%
1252.2 -
1313.0 5%
1462.9 11%
1603.2 10%
1528.8 -5%
1472.8 -4%
1164.9 -21%
1291.6 11%
1507.6 17%
1466.8 -3%
1433.6 -2%
2052.2 43%
2356.6 15%
2045.3 -13%
1337.7 -35%
1160.4 -13%
1537.5 32%
1987.1 29%
2020.3 2%
1745.1 -14%
1292.2 -26%
1084.2 -16%
1062.2 -2%
1703.0 60%
1749.5 3%
1741.0 0%
1812.0 4%
1631.0 -10%
1491.0 -9%
1385.0 -7%
1390.0 0%
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SOURCES: U.S. Dep't of Commerce;
UCLA Forecasting Project, University of California, Los Angeles
(available from author's files).
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TABLE 2
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND MORTGAGES HELD BY S&Ls
(1965-1988)
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
S109
Year Total Mortgages Home Mortgages Outstanding
Assets Held
% of Home
% Total % % of Mortgages Total %
change change Assets Outstanding change
1965 126.3
1966 131.4
1967 140.0
1968 148.9
1969 157.9
1970 170.9
1971 198.5
1972 233.7
1973 263.6
1974 288.0
1975 328.2
1976 379.6
1977 443.4
1978 506.3
1979 562.1
1980 613.7
1981 648.8
1982 697.6
1983 818.9
1984 977.0
1985 1,058.3
1986 1,140.6
1987 1,247.0
1988 1,359.9
- 108.1
4% 113.2
7% 119.5
6% 128.4
6% 137.9
8% 147.3
16% 169.2
18% 200.0
13% 227.1
9% 246.1
14% 273.5
16% 316.2
17% 371.3
14% 422.1
11% 466.1
9% 494.4
6% 512.2
8% 482.2
17% 529.4
19% 606.8
8% 654.6
8% 665.3
9% 711.5
9% 770.0
- 86%
5% 86%
6% 85%
7% 86%
7% 87%
7% 86%
15% 85%
18% 86%
14% 86%
8% 85%
11% 83%
16% 83%
17% 84%
14% 83%
10% 83%
6% 81%
4% 79%
-6% 69%
10% 65%
15% 62%
8% 62%
2% 58%
7% 57%
8% 57%
50%
49%
49%
49%
49%
50%
53%
56%
56%
56%
57%
59%
59%
57%
54%
52%
50%
45%
44%
45%
44%
39%
37%
35%
218.3
231.6
244.9
262.1
280.2
294.4
320.9
360.3
403.3
437.4
476.9
539.5
632.7
742.8
861.0
956.3
1,033.4
1,079.8
1,200.2
1,336.2
1,490.2
1,720.8
1,943.1
2,174.2
6%
6%
7%
7%
5%
9%
12%
12%
8%
9%
13%
17%
17%
16%
11%
8%
4%
11%
11%
12%
15%
13%
12%
SOURCE: Flow of Funds Accounts, Financial Assets and Liabilities, Year-
end (1963-1986)
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington,
D.C. 20551 (available from author's files).

